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Abstract
Background: People tend to prefer a smaller immediate reward to a larger but delayed reward. Although this discounting of
future rewards is often associated with impulsivity, it is not necessarily irrational. Instead it has been suggested that it
reflects the decision maker’s greater interest in the ‘me now’ than the ‘me in 10 years’, such that the concern for our future
self is about the same as for someone else who is close to us.
Methodology/Principal Findings: To investigate this we used a delay-discounting task to compare discount functions for
choices that people would make for themselves against decisions that they think that other people should make, e.g. to
accept $500 now or $1000 next week. The psychological distance of the hypothetical beneficiaries was manipulated in
terms of the genetic coefficient of relatedness ranging from zero (e.g. a stranger, or unrelated close friend), .125 (e.g.
a cousin), .25 (e.g. a nephew or niece), to .5 (parent or sibling).
Conclusions/Significance: The observed discount functions were steeper (i.e. more impulsive) for choices in which the
decision-maker was the beneficiary than for all other beneficiaries. Impulsiveness of decisions declined systematically with
the distance of the beneficiary from the decision-maker. The data are discussed with reference to the implusivity and
interpersonal empathy gaps in decision-making.
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Introduction
Each day people have to make decisions, weighing up options
and choices both in relatively small and trivial matters and in those
with potentially life-changing consequences. The last 30 years of
decision-making research have rendered the idea that decision-
makers are primarily guided by rational processes, embodied in
the idea of homo economicus, little more than a straw man [1].
There are numerous examples which demonstrate the promi-
nent role of emotions in the decision making process. For example,
in decisions which present the choice between an immediate
reward and a later reward, the choice alternative which is only
available after a delay is worth less than the same amount available
now. The later alternative is discounted by time. This is not only
true when the choice options are of the same nominal value, but
also when a smaller but immediate reward is pitched against a later
but larger reward. Depending on the size of difference between the
rewards and the length of the delay, people often show a preference
for the smaller immediate reward and this seems to be driven by
the immediate gratification it brings. The preference for the
smaller reward will disappear when it is not immediately but only
relatively sooner available than the later larger reward, depending
upon how impulsive the decision-maker is. For example, one
decision maker may prefer $10 now to $20 dollars in 2 weeks, but
when the time delay is moved into the future so that the choices
are $10 in 1 year or $20 in 1 year and 2 weeks, then decision
makers prefer the later, larger reward. A different person (or
indeed one making a different decision) may only change their
preference after a much longer delay. This strengthens the
interpretation that these impulsive decisions are driven by seeking
immediate gratification, because when this is not available through
the earlier reward, the preference is for waiting for the larger later
reward. Whilst this decision making is impulsive it may not
necessarily be irrational, but a reflection of decision makers caring
more about their present self (me now) than a future self (me in 10
years) [2,3]. There are individual differences in decision makers’
impulsiveness [4]. Interestingly, Mischel and colleagues [5–7]
found that children’s ability to forego a small reward (1
marshmallow) for a larger later reward (2 marshmallows in 5
minutes) predicted their later scholastic and life success [8–10].
Whilst not a rational process decision makers nonetheless follow
predictable patterns in their decisions and much research has been
dedicated to understanding the exact processes underpinning these
decisions, with a particular focus on decisions made for the
decision-makers themselves. Many of the daily decisions made are
indeed for ourselves, however, a sizeable number of decisions are
actually made for others in a number of ways. For example,
decision outcomes may affect both the decision maker and others
or sometimes only others, we seek and give advice when faced with
decisions, and particularly in medical and financial contexts,
decisions are made for others by proxy and the tacit assumption in
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these ‘other-decisions’ is that decision-makers are able to
accurately predict the choice or outcome preference of the target
of the decision. The emotional component of decision-making,
however, presents sources of error, which can affect ‘other-
decisions’. The risk-as-feeling hypothesis [11] explains people’s
choices as partly driven by experiencing positive or negative
emotions in relation to risk or uncertainty, where positive emotions
lead to risk seeking behaviour (e.g. buying a lottery ticket) and
negative emotions to risk aversion (e.g. buying insurance).
However in making decisions for others there may be a hot-
cold-empathy gap [12], which leads us to believe that others have
more muted emotional reactions to risk and uncertainty than they
actually do and that these reactions influence others’ choices less
than they do. We would thus expect decisions made for others to
be systematically less influenced by emotional responses than
decisions for self. However, the results from a number of empirical
studies do not present a clear pattern of difference in self and other
decisions. Some studies show the expected hot-cold empathy gap:
decision-makers were more likely to choose an immediate reward
for themselves but delayed reward for other people [3], receiving
immediate rewards showed greater activation in the dopaminergic
reward system for self but not other decisions [13], give more risk
seeking advice about romantic relationships compared to self-
decisions [14] and predict less risk seeking and less risk averse
behaviour in others compared to self [15]. Other studies however
find no difference in self-other decisions in risk taking [16], waiting
time decisions [17], predicted choice of another on a financial task
relative to self [18] and Wray and Stone [19] comment that there
are generally no self-other differences in risky monetary situations.
Given the importance of many decisions made for others and the
lack of accuracy in many proxy decisions, for example, most proxy
medical end-of-life decisions do not reflect the preference of the
patient but those of the decisions maker [20], it is crucial to
understand the circumstances under which other-decisions are
different from self-decisions and the source of this difference.
Identifying the source of difference is the first step in constructing
a model which allows for more accurate decision making.
One important aspect of difference in studying decisions made
for others is the identity of ‘the other’ and in some studies this
identity has been found to make a difference (e.g. [18]) but without
giving rise to a predictive pattern. Jones and Rachlin [21] found
that social distance from the decision-maker to the target of the
decision systematically influenced how much money the decision
maker was willing to forego in order to also give a reward to
another person. This process of social discounting varied
systematically with the perceived closeness to the other and was
greatest for relatives or close friends and smallest for mere
acquaintances. Jones and Rachlin [21,22] stress that social
discounting is not solely due to genetic overlap, but we propose
that genetic overlap as measured by degree of kinship is a simple
and systematic way to model social distance. Genetic kinship is
expressed by the relatedness co-efficient r, with 1 describing the
closest relationship (self) and decreasing numbers reflect greater
familial distance, e.g., r = .5 includes parents and siblings, r = .25
includes grandparents, uncles, aunts, nieces and nephews, r = .125
includes cousins and so forth [23,24].
Making decisions in a delay-discounting paradigm requires
participants to make a number of decisions in which they trade-off
the gratification of the smaller but immediate reward (e.g. $700
now) against a fixed larger but delayed reward (e.g. $1000 in 2
weeks). The switch towards the larger, delayed reward depends on
the relative size of the smaller reward (a proportionally smaller
reward is less attractive) and the temporal distance of the larger
reward (when in the future is it available). The draw of the smaller
reward is the experience of immediate gratification and, based on
the predictions of the hot-cold empathy gap, we predict that
participants are less impulsive when making decisions for others
overall. Furthermore, if the identity of the ‘other’ as a target of
decisions is important then we expect that the degree of
relatedness as a model of social distance will have a systematic
influence on how impulsive decisions are made on their behalf
compared to decisions participants make for themselves.
Materials and Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was approved by the ethics committees of the School
of Psychology at the University of Nottingham and the School of
Psychology at the University of Lincoln. All of the participants
provided written informed consent prior to their participation.
Participants
Seventy undergraduate students from the universities of
Nottingham and Lincoln volunteered to take part in the
experiment. Sixty-one were female and 9 were male. The age
group ranged from 18 to 21 (M 18.66, SD 0.90). The number of
siblings, participants had, ranged from 0 to 4 (M 1, SD 0.96).
Stimuli
The experiment was run in Psychopy [25]. The stimuli
consisted of 450 choices between an immediate outcome and
a larger delayed outcome. Each item took the form:
Should [r] accept [v] now or wait for $1000 in [d]?
We manipulated social distance using Wright’s [2] co-efficient
of relationship (r). This resulted in 5 categories of relationship: r = 1
‘‘you’’, r = 0.5 ‘‘your mother’’, ‘‘your father’’, ‘‘your brother’’ or
‘‘your sister’’; r = 0.25 ‘‘your aunt’’, ‘‘your uncle’’, ‘‘your nephew’’,
or ‘‘your niece’’; r = 0.125 ‘‘your cousin’’; and r = 0 ‘‘your best
friend’’ or ‘‘a stranger’’. The immediate values (a) were $1, $10,
$20, $60, $100, $150, $250, $400, $500, $600, $750, $850, $900,
$950, or $1000. The delayed value (a) was fixed at $1000, but the
delay time (d) could be ‘‘7-days’’, ‘‘14-days’’, ‘‘1-month’’, ‘‘6-
months’’, ‘‘1-year’’, or ‘‘5-years’’.
On each trial the participant indicated their choice by pressing
one of two keys marked ‘‘now’’ or ‘‘later’’. After this the stimulus
disappeared and the next trial followed a 1.5sec inter-trial interval.
The order of presentation of the trials was fully randomized for
each participant so no two participants saw the same sequence of
trials [26]. The experiment was self-paced but took on average 45
minutes to complete.
Results
Impulsivity in inter-temporal choice is best described by
a hyperbolic function [27] in which the subjective discounted
value (v) of a sum (a) is discounted as a function (k) of the delay (d)
before the sum (a) can be received [28].
v~
a
1zkd
Small value of k indicates self-control in the sense that the
decision-maker is willing to wait longer to receive the reward.
Larger values of k indicate impulsivity.
The dependent variable k was estimated separately for each
participant and for each level of social distance. To do so, we first
found the average value (v) of the delayed amount (a = $1000)
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either side of the crossover point at which the participants switched
from preferring the larger later reward for the smaller sooner
reward. We then used a nonlinear regression to estimate the best
fitting value of k to describe the discount function across the
different delayed values. This resulted in 5 discount parameters,
one for each social distance, for each participant. Since these were
highly skewed these parameters were then log-transformed. The
average discount rates for each level of social distance are shown in
Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the effect of these different discount rates
in the subjective values of $1000 as a function of r and delay. The
log(-k) values were entered into a repeated-measures ANOVA with
social distance as the within-subjects factor with 5 levels (r=1,
r= .5, r= .25, r= .125 and r=0). For this first analysis the discount
parameters for r=0 were computed over decisions made on behalf
of both best friends and strangers.
The results showed a reliable quadratic trend of discount rates
by social distance F(1, 68) = 5.71,MSE=0.92, p,.05, g2p = .08, but
did not show a linear trend F(1,69) ,1.0. Because we wanted to
examine the effects of familiarity and the potential effects of
empathy we next re-ran the analysis replacing the average r=0
level with r=0 computed just over the best friend category. This
also revealed a reliable quadratic trend F(1,68) = 4.48,
MSE=0.87, p,.05, g2p =0.06, but no linear trend F(1,68) ,1.0.
This suggests that as social distance increases the participants
made less impulsive decisions relative to themselves except when
the recipient was their best friend. To confirm this we ran the
analysis with r = 0 computed over the stranger category. This
revealed a reliable linear trend F(1,68) = 6.81, MSE=0.82, p,.01,
g2p =0.91, but no quadratic component F(1,69) ,1.0. Figure 1
shows a clear difference in discount functions for unrelated best
friends for whom our decisions are similar in impulsivity to our
own, compared with unrelated strangers for whom our decisions
are less impulsive than our more distant relations. This suggests
that we become increasingly impartial about decisions as our
familiarity or distance with a recipient increases. That is, we think
that other people should make impartial decisions, but the more
familiar we are with them, or the closer in social distance, the less
self-controlled we think other people ought to be.
Discussion
The experiment reported here examined whether social
distance affects the impulsiveness of decisions that people make
on behalf of others. We manipulated social distance in terms of
familial relationships that can be conveniently measured numer-
ically in terms of the coefficient of relationship. Although we make
no claim specifically about how kin selection might influence
decision-making, we assume that there is a positive relationship
between familiarity and the coefficient of relationship. In terms of
models of decision-making this familiarity involves varying degrees
of empathy. It follows that the closer our relationship with another
the greater our empathy with that person. A good deal of research
suggests that decision-making is often less than optimal because
our emotions influence the subjective value or probability of an
outcome. This is apparent in impulsivity and in the discounting of
future rewards and losses. Since we have empathetic links with
other people it follows that we are likely to have varying degrees of
feeling for their potential outcomes. Indeed the results of our
experiment confirm that the closer our relationship with another
person the closer our discount function for decisions that we might
make for them is to our own.
Figure 1. Average discount rates for each level of social distance. The participant has a relationship of 1 with themselves which decreases
systematically with degree of relatedness r = .5 includes parents and siblings; r= .25 includes aunts, uncles, nephews and nieces; r= 125 includes
cousins. Importantly, at 0 relatedness someone could be a stranger or a close friend.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049479.g001
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The results show that the underlying decision making process is
capable of making rational controlled decisions in the sense that the
discount rates for decision made for unrelated people are far lower
than those that we make ourselves [18]. These are cold appraisals of
the outcomes presumably because we have no connection with
strangers [18]. That is, when there is an interpersonal empathy gap,
emotions influence the decision less and the outcome ismore optimal
in the economic sense. However, the discount functions for
hypothetical best friends are similar to our first-degree relatives,
presumably because although the coefficient of relationship is zero,
our familiarity and closeness to our best friends is high. We expect
this effect to be limited to the reward frame because we would not
expect an individual to make a decision that would cause their close
relatives, or best friend, pain or loss. For example, a parent might
encourage their offspring to save money, but tend not to encourage
them to engage in self-destructive behaviors such as smoking, even
when they themselves might smoke.
The burgeoning literature on surrogate-decision making shows
inconclusive effects of changing the target of decision from ‘self’ to
‘other’ [1,3,14,19]. Here we show the first demonstration that the
identity of the beneficiary has a systematic effect on the decision-
makers’ impulsivity. This has important implications for un-
derstanding the processes underlying decisions made for others
and the interpretation of existing research in the area, because it
suggests that asking decision-makers about an ‘‘other’’ is not
a meaningful category, if the perceived closeness to the ‘‘other’’
systematically changes the emotional biases observed in decisions.
This may explain the disparity in the findings of the existing proxy
decision making literature, which does not consistently report
differences between self and other decisions. It implies that in
future research the identity of the ‘other’ needs to be specified and
comparisons between studies need to focus more on the identity of
the ‘other’ and not presume that findings can be extrapolated from
one specific group of beneficiaries to another.
The surrogate-decision making literature must consider the
relationship between the decision-maker and the beneficiaries of
those decisions, because the precise nature of the relationship
between the self and other can affect the optimality of those
decisions. For example, surrogate medical decisions if made by
a close relative of the patientmay reflect their ownpreferences rather
than the preferences of the patient [16]. If so, this would further
question the validity of the substituted judgment as the gold standard
in medical surrogate decision making [29], since this model assumes
that the decision maker can accurately state the patient’s wishes
independently and irrespective of their own. At first glance it looks as
though the most optimal decisions are made by people who are
unrelated to the recipient, but this neglects the emotional appraisal
of the decision outcome and only reflects the economic outcome.
Thus a physician might be best placed to make a substituted
judgment on behalf of a patient but this may well be a different
judgment than the one made by a close relative. It is a value
judgment whether the economic benefit should outweigh the
perceived personal satisfaction of the decision outcome.
Future research should investigate whether perceived social
closeness, as modeled by relatedness, affects the importance we
ascribe to decision-outcomes which are based on emotional aspects
compared to impartial aspects of increased utilities.
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